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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze the factors that affect the tenure choice of young adults,
highlighting the impact of mortgage lender imposed borrowing constraints. The data set is a
panel of youth age 20-33 for the years 1985-90. Our methods differ from most prior studies in
many ways including consideration of possible sample selection bias, a richer model of the
stochastic error structure, better measurement of which households are bound by borrowing
constraints, and a fuller consideration of the endogeneity of wealth and income. Once all
changes are implemented, we find ownership tendencies to be quite sensitive to economic
variables. Specifically, potential earnings, the relative cost of owning a home, and especially
borrowing constraints affect the tendency to own a home. In our sample of youth, 37% of
households are constrained even after choosing their loan-to-value ratio to minimize the impact
of the separate wealth and income requirements. The constraints reduce the probability of
ownership of these households by 10 to 20 percentage points (a third to a halo depending on the
particular characteristics of the household.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tenure choice has been conventionally viewed as determined by three factors: permanent
income, the cost of owning relative to renting, and household life-cycle attributes (Rosen, 1985).
Permanent income (both long term earnings capacity and income from nonhuman capital), rather
than current income, is important because tenure choice and housing consumption are long term
decisions 1 A series of papers published in 1989 added lender borrowing constraints as a
determinant (Jones, 1989, Linneman and Wachter, 1989, and Zom, 1989). Owing to information
asymmetries and moral hazard, lenders base borrowing capacity on measurable current income and
liquid assets rather than future income and total wealth. Liquid assets are important because lenders
require equity contributions of borrowers. The importance of liquid wealth for a down payment is
conceptually distinct from its effect through permanent income or total wealth inclusive of human
capital, Whether the liquid wealth constraint is an important factor in tenure choice, separately from
permanent income, must be empirically determined. That these factors are distinct, however, is
conceptually clear.
In this paper we analyze the factors that tiect the tenure choice of young adults, extending
earlier work to include intertemporal data, We focus on the group making the transition to
homeownership; the data set is a panel of youth age 20-33 for the years 1985-90. The issue of
constraints is likely to be far more relevant for these households than for established older
households. Our methods differ from most prior studies in many ways including consideration of
possible sample selection bias, a richer model of the stochastic error structure, better measurement
of which households me bound by borrowing constraints, and a fuller consideration of the
endogeneity of wealth and income.3
The paper is structured as follows, We first review the 1989 papers and more recent
contributions. In Sections III and IV we discuss the data and our innovations to modeling the tenure
decision. We report the results in Section V and then conclude.
II. RECENT STUDIES
Linneman and Wachter (hereafter L-W) use micro data to quantify the impact of income and
wealth constraint measures on individual homeownership propensities. The measures are based on
the requirements for mortgages that qualify for purchase by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association, which set industry standards. L-W
first estimate the value of the desired home using a sample of unconstrained homeowners, defined
as those having purchased a home whose value is less than 85°/0of the maximum value allowed by
both the income and wealth constraints. Desired house value is calculated for the rest of their sample
using the coefficients estimated from the sample of unconstrained owners (V*). Knowledge of a
households current income, wealth, and desired home purchase price allows, L-W to measure the
extent that a household’s desired purchase price exceeds the maximum home purchase price that
would satis~ industry borrowing standards.
L-W formulate six constraint measures, three each for income and wealth, For wealth (W),
two dummy variables indicate whether the household is highly constrained or moderately
constrained. They define the maximum house purchase price allowable under the wealth constraint
as:
Vw = W/(1 -LTV*) (1)4
where LTV* is the maximum LTV allowed by lenders. If desired house value is greater than Vw,
then the household is defined to be highly wealth constrained. If desired house value is between
90V0and 100% of Vw, then the household is moderately wealth constrained. That is, if
Vw < V*, then Wealth Gap-High = 1, else Wealth Gap-High= O
Vw > V* 2 o.9vw’ then Wealth Gap-Moderate = 1, else Wealth Gap-Moderate= O (2)
The third variable is the difference between the desired and constrained house values for highly
constrained households:
Wealth Gap-$ Shortage = (V* - Vw) * (Wealth Gap-High). (3)
The expected coefficient signs of all three variables when entered in the tenure choice equation are
negative.
The three income constraints are similarly defined. The maximum house purchase price
allowable under the current income (y) constraint is:
V1= 0,28y/rLTV* (4)
where r is the interest rate and the 0.28 reflects the lender constraint that the loan payment cannot
exceed 28 percent of income (the loan payment is interest only). Two dummy variables (Income
Gap-High and Income Gap-Moderate) and a continuous variable (Income Gap-$ Shortage) are5
defined in the same way as for the wealth constraints, L-W set L~* equal to 0.8.
The probability of homeownership is estimated for recent movers using data from two
periods: 1975 to 1979, and 1981 to 1983. To provide a baseline for comparison with traditional
specifications, the model was also estimated excluding borrowing constraint variables. Including
borrowing constraints markedly improved the fit of the model for both sample periods and
substantially reduced the estimated impact of household income and age. The wealth constraint
variables had larger impacts than the income variables. Their research indicated that even in well-
developed capital markets, the presence of borrowing constraints, particularly the wealth constraint,
negatively affects homeownership propensities.
Zom (1989) tested a model of tenure choice based on utility maximization over three
options: maintain current housing, move to owned residence, or move to rental housing using data
on 4000 households surveyed in May 1986 by the Joint Center for Housing Studies. Rather than
treating the income and wealth constraints separately, he measured the extent to which the
constraints bind as the difference between the desired house value and the minimum value allowed
under the more binding of the two constraints, again assuming an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio.
Because borrowing constraints limit the quantity of housing that households are able to acquire as
owners, he argued that the tenure-choice decision is driven not by the traditional ratio of the costs
of owning and renting, but by an assessment of the level of utility attainable from the overall
consumption bundle of housing and non-housing goods selected under each tenure alternative. His
data supported the hypothesis that movement to owned housing is less likely than the other options
when estimated household income and wealth constraints bind.
LaFayette, Haurin, and Hendershott (1995) follow Zom in that they measured the extent to6
which households were constrained using the more binding of the income and wealth constraints and
they assessed the level of utility attainable from the overall consumption bundle. Their innovation
is allowing households to select the loan-to-value ratio and mortgage product that minimizes the
constraint.2 To illustrate the LTV decision, for most households the constraint is minimized by
selecting the LTV that equates the two constraint values, The result is
LTV* = 0.28y/(0.28y + rW) (5)
Allowing for mortgage and LTV choice reduces the fraction of recently moving households
estimated to be constrained by about a third.
The potentird importance of wealth to tenure choice has also been considered by Jones
(1989). Using a Canadian data set, he finds that current net worth plays a far more important role
than human capital in tiggering home ownership. A model highlighting the importance of current
wealth argues that if the lender imposed wealth constraint is unavoidable, then dl new homeowners
will have current net wealth sufficient to make the down payment on their purchased house. Also,
if ownership is the desired tenure choice for all households and only the wealth constraint prohibits
some from owning, then all renters will have wealth less than that required by the constraint. Thus,
the outcome of a comparison of current wealth and the minimal amount required to meet the lending
constraint for the desired house will predict homeownership perfectly.
However, current wealth is not an exogenous variable in a household’s multipenod choice
of whether or when to become a homeowner, Rather, annual savings decisions determine wealth,
and saving is partly determined by a household’s choice of labor supply and expenditures (other7
factors include wage rates, gifts, and inheritances). In fact, the desire to become a homeowner is
likely a major determinant of wealth accumulation of youth (Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter,
1996b). This argument
tenure choice must allow
suggests that tests of the importance of mortgage lender constraints on
wealth and the indicator of whether the wealth constraint is binding to be
endogenous, unlike Jones’ treatment of it m exogenous. ~ Because ownership intentions are
influenced by the ability of the household to save, cross-sectional data are not likely to enable an
analyst to sort out the causal structure between saving and homeownership, The availability of
intertemporal data should allow a better understanding of this linkage.
III. DATA
Our primary data set is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR) at the Ohio State University.
annually dating from 1979, wealth is reported beginning only in 1985. The
(NLSY), housed at the
Although it is collected
survey has an excellent
retention rate (900/0or higher), The method of collecting data is reported in the NLS Handbook of
the Center for Human Resource Research (1993), Respondents were age 14-21 in 1979; thus, our
study from 1985 to 1990 includes youth ages 20 to 32. During these ages, youth are saving toward
their first home purchase, a critical time for our study.
A detailed description of the data set is contained in Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (H-H-
W, 1996a). In that study, we tested the reliability of the wealth data by comparing it with the Survey
of Consumer Finances and found it to be comparable, Also, we compared the reported home
ownership rates in the NLSY to those in the American Housing Survey and again found good
comparability. Other variables in our study have been tested and found to be reliable, these reports8
summarized in H-H-W (1996a). The means of variables used in our study are listed in Table 1. All
nominal data are deflated.
One positive mpect of the panel data is that the intertemporal consistency of a respondent’s
data can be checked, outliers identified and deleted or corrected if other corroborative information
is present. The resulting data set is superior to a single cross-section in terms of accuracy of
measurement. Another positive aspect is that respondent specific unobsemed variables can be
accounted for in the error structure of the econometric model.
An important variable not present in the NLSY is the cost of constant-quality housing. This
measure is a component of the owner cost of housing and the relative owner-renter cost, We use the
Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac repeat sales house price index because it has wide spatial coverage and
is available for 1985-90. This series has good correlation with other series such as Coldwell Bank,
the series reported in Haurin, Hendershott, and Kim (1991), and the American Chamber of
Commerce series (see H-H-W 1996a), Because the repeat sales series is an index, we need a single
cross section of house price levels to obtain level data. We use the 1987 American Chamber of
Commerce data (ACCRA 1987).
IV. TENURE CHOICE AND LENDER CONSTRAINTS
We reconsider and extend the L-W method of analysis of the impact of lender constraints
on tenure choice. The extensions include better memurement of desired house value, the use of
exogenous proxies for permanent income, the treatment of wealth as endogenous, allowance for
endogenous loan-to-value choice, and a superior econometric technique. Below, we discuss
each modification.9
Desired House Value
The measurement of the constraint variables requires measurement of the value of the
house that would be purchased if there were no mortgage lender constraints, L-W’s
memurement technique uses a sample restricted to unconstrained owners to estimate desired
house value for rdlhouseholds. However, this sample of unconstrained households maybe
selective and if so, the resulting estimation of house value on household characteristics and
house price would not be applicable to constrained homeowners and renters. For example, it is
possible that the sample of unconstrained owners consists of households that have a taste for
atypically small houses. The predicted value of the desired house value should be derived using
a method that corrects for possible sample selection bi~ such as the Heckman two-step
correction technique (1979).
We applied the Heckman method to our longitudinal sample and found no evidence of
4 Thus our method of deriving the desired house value is an OLS sample selection bias. ,
regression of the log of house value on a set of household characteristics and the cost of owned
housing using a sample of unconstrained owners. The results are reported in column 1 of Table
A-1. Explanato~ variables replicate the L-W set and include age, marriage, family size, gender,
Black, Hispanic, permanent income, central ci~ location, suburban location, whether in an
MSA, three regional variables, and the log of the owner cost of housing. Permanent income and
the owner cost of housing are based on standard formulations (Goodman and Kawai 1982;
Hendershott and Shilling 1982).5 In the estimation of desired house value, we fmd that the most
significant factors are permanent income, age, race/ethnicity, marriage, central city location, and
regional location.10
Permanent Income and Wages
The concept of permanent income is only valid if labor supply is fixed (Killingsworth
1983). For youth, this assumption is not appropriate. Thus we replace permanent income with a
measure of the wage a youth could earn if employed full time @otential wage), this variable
being independent of other endogenous choices such as labor supply or living arrangement
(Haurin, Hendershott, and Kim, 1994). We predict wages separately for respondent and spouse
(if present), me estimation cannot be limited to full time working youth because of the
possibility of selection him. We found that estimation results best conform to expectations when
we use a tobit model on the full sample, Explanatory variables include age, highest grade
completed, an achievement test score, gender, race/ethnicity, and health, For the respondent, all
variables are significant at the 5°/0 level except for age and education level-squared. The most
significant are the achievement test score, gender, and race/ethnicity. The results for spouses are
not m good, but the sample of positive wage observations is much smaller. Results are reported
in columns 2 and 3 of Table A-1.
Endogenous Wealth
The wealth and constraint variables should be treated as endogenous to account for youth
simultaneously determining tenure status and savings. This modification requires a 2SLS
approach be used to create an instrumental variable for wealth. Our longitudinal data set allows
us to test a random effects model that allows for autocorrelation. The model is:
W1t=a+~’Zit+ui+~it (6)11
~it=P~i,t.l ‘nit
2 COV[~i~ ~ E [~i] = 0, VU [ui] = Ou > u] = o,
In equation (6), wealth is a fmction of the explanatory variables Z, a household specific random
error ui, and a random error ~it. This latter term is allowed to be autocorrelated as described in
(7). The estimation method is generalized least squares.6
Results of the wealth estimation are reported in column 4 of Table A-1. Identification is
achieved by inclusion of a number of variables such m the total number of years mmied, gifts
from relatives, and parental education level. Gifts, number of years married, highest grade
completed, and age are the most significant variables. A Lagrange multiplier test of this model
versus the alternative of a nonautocorrelated classical regression model yields a Lagrange
multipler statistic of 1802, this being highly significant. The intertemporal correlation of
household specific residuals is estimated to be 0.5. The autocorrelation (p in eqn. 7) is ordy
-0.05. The predicted value of wealth derived from this estimation is then used in the derivation
of the constraint variables described in equations (2) and (3).
Measurement of the Income and Wealth Constraints
The L-W method yields a total of six measures of the tightness of the lender imposed
income and wealth constraints. We halve the number of variables to three by accounting for a
household’s optimal adjustment to the income and wealth constraints. As explained in
Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin (1996) and LaFayette, Haurin, and Hendershott (1995), a
(7)
(8)
(9)12
household falls into one of three categories: it is either unconstrained by the lender requirements
regarding current income and wealth, constrained by one of the two requirements, or constrained
by both. If bound by only one constraint when the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is 0.8, a household
will move away from the 0.8 LTV to loosen the binding constraint even though this action
tightens the nonbinding constraint. LTV is modified until one of three cases occurs: the
household is constrained by neither requirement, both constraints are equally binding in terms of
how much housing can be purchased, or the household faces a limiting case such as being unable
to obtain a loan for less than a 5°/0 down payment, In the first case, the constraints are zero, In
the other two cmes, we determine the optimal LTV by finding the value that makes the
constraints equally binding with the requirement that L~ be no greater than 0.95 (see equ 5).
h these cases, some households who were judged highly constrained by L-W’s method become
moderately constrained, and their measure of the wealth or income shortfall decremes,
We report the percentage of constrained households in Table 2. L-W’s reported
percentages of constrained households depend on the time period. During 1981-83, they fmd
that 27% of households are highly income constrained and 40% are highly wealth constrained.
Those moderately constrained are 6% and l% respectively. When we replicate L-W’s method
and detitions of the constraints, we find that the percentage of highly income constrained
households is nearly identical (28Yo),but the percentage highly wealth constrained is much
higher (58Yo)m expected given our younger sample. About five percent of young households
are moderately constrained. When households select the optimal LTV, we expect the most
binding constraint to be loosened, This expectation is confirmed because the average LTV rises
to 0.85, resulting in only 37V0being highly constrained by either income or wealth. 7 Moderately13
constrtied household now equal 6°/0of the sample. 8
Model of Tenure Choice
The tendency to ow a home is resumed to have the general form:
Oit = ~~’ ‘it + Pi + ‘it.
The explanato~ variables included in X are the potential wage, cost of owning relative to
rentingg, race/ethnicity, family size, marital status, expected length of tenancy, and a vector of
wealth/income mortgage constraint measures. We do not observe the tendency to own; rather,
we observe the result of the discrete choice of whether to own or rent.
The error structure in the tendency to own equation contains the usual random
component and a person specific random error Pi, a generalization of the typical cross-sectional
approach. The complete error structure is:
VM(.li + ‘it) “ ‘w(~it) = ‘P 2 + UV2
2 = (sp2/(op2 + UV2), CO#(~i~ ‘is) q ~
The likelihood fiction and details of the estimation are in Butler and Moffltt (1982), 10 A
significant p indicates that the household specific stochastic errors are correlated over time, in
which cme a simple probit approach applied to the entire panel of data would be inappropriate,
This structure addresses the problem of unobsewed heterogeneity that results from omitted
vtiables, an approach possible only with a panel data set.
(lo)
(11)
(12)14
V. RESULTS
Ourfirst task is to replicate the estimation method and variables of L-W (1989), thus
cofirming their original study and deriving a baseline against which to compare the new results.
Although our source of data differs from L-W, most of their explanatory variables are available
or can be created from the NLSY, The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the
respondent is a homeowner. L-W’s explanatory variables are demographic (Black, Hispanic,
family size, married, and age of head) and economic (permanent income, cost of homeowning
relative to renting, expected duration of tenancy, and a series of indicators of mortgage lender
constraints). 11 Differences between our baseline case and L-W include our use of a longitudinal
data set rather than a cross-section, use of probit rather than Iogit, and treatment of age as
continuous given the limited age range of our respondents rather than splitting age of head into
seven categories. Initially, although our sample is longitudind, we simply pool the data and do
not account for intertemporal correlation of household specific residuds.
Given that the data sets cover different periods and contain different ages of household
head (ours is limited to young adults while L-W include the entire age spectrum), it would not be
surprising if estimation results differed. The comparison of their outcomes for 1975-77 and
1981-83 to our result is reported in Table 3 where we find substantial similarity. Whenever an
economic variable is significant in L-W, it is significant in our estimation and, in a few cmes, we
find additionrd coefficients are significant and have the sign predicted by theory, Coeticients of
some demographic variables differ (e.g., family size and Black), perhaps explained by the much
lower average age in our sample. A comparison of the key elasticities of ownership tendencies
also yields the conclusion that our baseline findings are similar to those of L-W when their15
method is replicated. For example, the elasticity of homeownership with respect to the relative
cost of owning is estimated to be -0.93 by L-W compared with our estimate of-1.25. Estimates
of the elasticity of ownership with respect to permanent income are O.37 and 0.31 respectively.
We conclude that use of L-W’s methodology on a different data set yields generally similar
findings.
We next execute the improvements discussed previously and determine whether any of
the baseline results change. Table 4 lists our bmeline estimates in the first column of results, 12
In the next column we replace income with two wage variables, we replace the six constraint
variables with three, and we replace observed wealth with an instrumental variable, However,
we do not impose the random effects model of the stochastic errors, Significant effects are found
for respondent’s and spouse’s potential wages, the relative cost of owning, indicators of whether
the household is highly or moderately constrained and marriage. All these coefficients have the
expected signs.
In the final column we report the results of the random effects estimation where we fmd
the estimate of period to period error correlation is 0.73, this being highly significant. 13 Thus,
we find evidence that there are omitted variables in the tenure choice estimation. Lender
constraints reduce the probability of otig for both highly and moderately constrained
households. The coefficient of the variable indicating the household is highly constrained is
only one-third that of the coefficient of the separate wealth constraint (compare coefficients in
column 1 with column 3), but it is slightly greater than that of the income constraint. A similar
pattern holds for moderately constrained households.
The impact of being hi~y constrained on the probability of ownership depends on the16
values of the other explanatory variables. Our example is for a 30 year old white married couple
with one child having average wages, relative cost of owning, and expected length of tenancy.
The probability of owning a home is 0.20 if the household is unconstrained. If constrained, the
probability of owning falls to about 0,10, Instead, if wages equal $10 hourly for both respondent
and spouse rather than the mean of about $7, the probability of owning is 0.52 if unconstrained,
If constrained, the probability falls substantially to 0.34. 14 We find that the variable measuring
the housing shortfall created by the lender constraints (i.e., the strength of the lender constraint)
has no significant separate impact on the tenure decision; rather, the two dummy variables
explain the total impact,
Other significant explanatory variables include the cost of owning, respondent’s and
spouse’s wage rates, expected length of tenancy, and marriage, The resultant reduction in the
annualized expected transaction cost of selling caused by longer expected tenancy increases the
likelihood of ownership. Marriage also raises the probability of homeownership, this effect
observed although household wealth and potential wages are controlled, We find no effect of
family size or the race/ethnicity indicators. Increased age has a marginally significant positive
effect on the tendency to own a home.
The random effects approach changes many coefficient values compared with the case
where p is constrained to be zero (column 2). Coefficients for respondent’s wage and age
double, that of marriage increases by 50%, that of spouse’s wage rises by 40%, that of expected
length of tenancy rises by a factor of six, that of relative cost rises in absolute value by 240Y0,
and that for the highly constrained indicator falls by 30°/0. Overall, the coefficients in the
random effects estimation are larger suggesting that young households are more sensitive to17
changes in explanatory variables. Elasticity estimates of the ownership tendency are 0.5 with
respect to wages, -1.4 for relative costs, 0.5 for expected length of tenmcy, and 0.9 for age. As
noted above, if borrowing requirements are binding, the tendency to own is substantially
reduced.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Three 1989 papers provided the first evidence that lender imposed borrowing constraints
adversely affect home ownership propensities, Our study builds on these by using a data set
restricted to young households, who are most likely to be constrained, and making a number of
improvements to their methods. We find that borrowing constraints significantly reduce the
tendency toward ownership.
Our methods differ from these studies in five ways, First, because household saving is
clearly a choice variable for young households (Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter 1996a),
household wealth is simultaneously determined with tenure choice. We use an instrumental
variable approach to address this concern, endogenizing our measure of borrowing constraint
severity, Second, we consider the problem of sample selection bim in the estimation of a
household’s desired amount of housing, this being an input to the borrowing constraint
memures, However, we find no evidence of selection bias in our sample. Third, we reject the
use of permanent income in the tenure choice equation because income depends on labor supply
which is clearly jointly determined (Haurin, Hendershott and Kim, 1994), Instead, we use an
estimate of wages earned if employed full time and fmd that increases in either respondent’s or
spouse’s wages raise their propensity to become a homeowner. Fourth, our sample is a panel18
data set, Panel data allow us to estimate a richer error structure where we test for household
specific random errors that are correlated over time. We fid that the correlation of errors is
highly significant and large, 0.73. Accounting for this correlation has a substantial impact on
explanatory variables’ Coefficients in the tenure choice model, generally increasing their size.
Fifth, we allow households to minimize the impact of income and wealth constraints by
optimizing their loan-to-value ratio (Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin, 1996). This change
substantially reduces the estimated number of households facing a binding constraint,
01.u first step in the estimation is to replicate Linneman and Wachters results, but with a
sample of younger households. In spite of this difference in data, similar results are obtained if a
similar estimation method is used. This finding allows us to identifi differences resulting from
the five changes in estimation technique,
In our preferred model, we find that the tendency toward owning a home is sensitive to a
household’s earning capacity as memured by wage rates, Ownership propensities also depend
on the cost of owning relative to renting, age, marital status, and the expected length of tenancy.
Compared to L-W, our estimates of the responsiveness of ownership to these variables is larger
and generally have a higher level of statistical significance,
We address the question of whether binding borrowing constraints influence home
ownership probabilities. We find that if a household is constrained or very nearly constrained
because of low current income or wealth, then its probability of owning is substantially reduced.
The reduction depends on the values of other explanato~ variables, We give two examples: if
the unconstrained probability of owning is 0.2, the imposition of a borrowing constraint reduces
the likelihood of owning by half If the unconstrained probability is 0.5, the reduction in19
probability of owning is a third.
An interesting finding is that if a household faces a binding constraint, there is no
additional effect on the tendency to own if the shortfall in current wealth or income is increased.
That is, our results suggest marginally constrained households are no more likely to own than
severely constrained households. That is, households do not downsize the desired size of an
owned property until it is no longer constrained, a result consistent with the findings of
LaFayette, Haurin, andHendershott(1995). Also, the policy implication is that intervention to
reduce the severity of the constraint faced by households will not tiect homeownership unless
the intervention eliminates the constraint.20
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1.Transaction costs, including high search and information costs, and the difficulty of incrementally
changing consumption, prevent households from adjusting housing quantity instantaneously in
response to changing demand (Muth and Goodman 1989).
2. LaFayette, Haurin, and Hendershott (1995) define the amount of wealth available for a down
payment as total wealth less one month of salary, pension investments, consumer durables, closing
costs, and mortgage points. This approach suggests that L-W’s moderate wealth constraint indicator
equals unity when a household is constrained by “available” wealth, assuming that 10°/0of wealth
is described by the list of alternative uses.
3, Similar comments apply to current income and the lender imposed income constraint.
4. The first step of the procedure is to estimate a probit model of which households are included in
the sample of unconstrained owners, From this estimation, an inverse Mills ratio (A) is created and
inserted in the housing demand equation. The significance level of Ais only O.3; thus there is no
evidence of selection bias in this sample.
5. L-W determine permanent income using the human capital model of Goodman andKawai(1982).
Explanatory variables include highest grade completed, age of head of household, family size and
the three squares of these terms. Also included are dummy variables for head being male or Black.
We replicate their approach except that our estimation allows for a random household specific
stochastic error in our panel data, All coefficients are significant with the expected sign except for
fmily size.
The owner cost is: P((l -~Y)i+ d + (1- ZY) ~P- n’) where P is the local real constant-quality house
price index, i is the interest rate, d is the depreciation and maintenance rate, rYis the marginal income
tax rate, rP is the local property tax rate, and X’ is expected house price inflation. The source of
house prices was described previously, interest rates fell from 0.124 in 1985 to O.101 in 1990,
depreciation and maintenance equal 0.035 annually, and expected house price inflation is 0.04.
Property taxes vary by state and the marginal tax rate is calculated by the NBER TAXSIM program
for years 1985 to 1990. We thank Daniel Feenberg for his assistance in calculating the marginal tax
rates,
6, The method is described in detail in LIMDEP version 6.0, pp. 298-312.
7. Wealth continues to be the (slightly) more binding constraint, the evidence being that after LTV
optimization, only 30°/0of households face a binding income constraint while 37°/0face a binding
wealth constraint. This difference occurs because 7V0 of households reach the maximal LTV
allowed (0.95). As expected, there are no households constrained only by income after the LTV is
optimized.
8. Comparison with L-H-H (1995) is difficult because they allow for choice of mortgage among
FHA FRMs and conventional FRMs and ARMs.23
9. The correct measure of the relative cost of owning compared to renting is the ratio of owner costs
to renter costs. The owner cost memure differs from that used in the estimation of housing demand
because the marginal tax rate is replaced by the tenure choice tax rate (Hendershott and Slemrod,
1983). The tenure choice tax rates were calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM program, Our rental
cost variable is from Coldwell Banker and it measures the rental cost of a constant-quality dwelling
unit in a large number of MSAS. However, the Coldwell Banker sample of MSAS is 25°/0 less than
the Freddie Mac-Fannie Mae house price sample. Estimation using the larger sample and owner
costs (based on the tenure choice tax rate) produces very similar results to estimates based on the
smaller sample using the relative cost of owning. We report results from the larger sample because
most of the variation in the relative price ratio is due to variation in real house prices, not in rents
(Capozza, Hendershott and Green, 1996).
10, The advantage of their model is that it is relatively easy to estimate. The disadvantage is that the
correlation is the same from period to period.
11. We create expected length of tenancy using L-W’s method.
12. We do not list L-W’s results because logit specifications yields coefficients that differ from
probit models, although marginal effects can be compared.
13. The Chi-squared test of the reduction in log-likelihood yields a value of 637. With one degree
of freedom, this is significant at the 0.001 level.
14. If both wages equal $8.30 hourly, the predicted probability of ownership is 0.35 if unconstrained,
the same as the sample mean in L-W. If the household is constrained, the probability of ownership
falls to 0.21, a 40% reduction. In contrast, L-W report that highly constrained households (either
income or wealth) were 20°/0 less likely to own implying a reduction in ownership rates from 0.35
to 0.28.Table 1: MeansofVariables
1
Mean Variables Mean Variables
2.23 OwnershipRate 0.18 PermanentIncome
RelativeCostofOwning 0.98 II FamilySize I 2.72
ExpectedLengthofTenancy 11.22 II R/Test Score I 4.19
IncomeGap-High 0.17 II HouseValue** I 5.41
IncomeGap-Moderate 0.04 II R/Male I 0.44
IncomeGap-$Shortage 0.20 1] R/Bad Health
WealthGap-High 0.64 II HousePriceindex I 8.45
WealthGap-Moderate
WealthGap-$Shortage
GiftsFromRelatives
Black 0.32 II SpouseWage I 7.21
Hispanic
R/Age
S/Age
Married
YearsMarried*
~ighest GradeCompleted
S/HighestGradeCompleted
0.37 II Northeast I 0.19
3.43 II NorthCentral I 0.35
12.41II West I 0.20
12.14 II I
Notes: R indicatesthe respondent,S indicatesthespouse. Permanentincome,relativecost,thetwo $ shortagegap
variables,the constant-qualityhousepriceindex,andhousevalueareintensofthousandsof dollars. House value is
the mean for only those who own homes. Years married and all spouse means are for only married respondents.Table 2: Comparison ofEstimates of the Percentage ofHouseholds
Constrained by Mortgage Lender Income and Wealth Requirements
Constraint L-W H-H-W
1981-83 1985-90
Income Gap-High 27% 28%
Wealth Gap-Moderate 1% 5%
Minimized Gap-Moderate ---- ----
H-H-W
1985-90
----
----
37%
----
----
6%
Note: L-W is Linneman and Wachter (1989), H-H-W is this study.Table 3: Comparison of Linneman-Wachter and Haurin-Hendershott-Wachter
Tenure Choice Estimation Results
Variables ‘Pd l-w’’’’-”
L-W 1981-83
lPemanent Income 1+NS . . 1+ 5%
Relative Cost of Owning - - N.S. - 1%
Expected Length of Tenancy + - N.S. + N.S.
Income Gap-High - 1% - 5~o
Income Gap-Moderate - - lVO - N.S.
llncome Gap-$Shortage 1- 1- N.S. 1- N.S.
lWealth Gap-High 1- 1- 1% 1- 5%
Wealth Gap-Moderate - - 1% - N.S.
Wealth Gap-$ Shortage - + N.S. - 1%
Black - N.S. - N.S.
Hispanic - N.S. + N.S.
Head Age + + see note + see note
Married + + 1% + 1o%
Family Size + + 10/0 + N.S.
H-H-W 1985-90
Baseline Case
+ 100/0
1%
+ 10/0
- 5%
- 1Ovo
+ N.S.
- 1%
- l%
- 1%
+ So/o
- N.S.
- N.S.
+ 10/0
- N.S.
Note: L-W include a series of seven age range dummy variables, In general, ownership tendencies rise as
age increases and, if a single variable was included, it would likely be statistically significant.Table 4: Probit Estimation Results of Homeownership Tendencies
Variables Baseline Extended Model landom Effects
Uonstant -1.51 (5.3) -1.62 (6.4) -4.95 (10.0)
Permanent Income 0.17 (1.7) ---- ----
Respondent Wage ---- 0.08 (4.2) 0.18 (4.4)
Spouse Wage ---- 0.06 (3.0) 0.09 (2.0)
Relative Cost of Owning -1.45 (10.5) -1.27 (10.5) -3.02 (1 1.4)
Expected Length of Tenancy 0.21 (3.8) 0.04 (0.7) 0.23 (2.4)
Income Gap-High -0.33 (1.9) ---- ----
Income Gap-Moderate -0.28 (1.6) ---- ----
Income Gap-$ Shortage 0.04 (0.5) ---- ----
Wealth Gap-High -1.17 (12.1) ---- .-. .
Wealth Gap-Moderate -0.99 (5.9) ---- ----
Wealth Gap-$ Shortage -0.11 (3.5) ---- ----
Minimized Gap-High .... -0.54 (4.9) -0.38 (2.5)
Minimized Gap-Moderate ---- -0.47 (3.6) -0.55 (3.3)
Minimized Gap-$ Shortage .... 0.01 (0,2) -0.13 (0.2)
Black 0.28 (2.0) -0,17 (1.4) 0.14 (0.6)
Hispanic -0.12 (1.6) 0.06 (0.8) 0.17 (0.8)
Head Age -0.02 (0.7) 0.03 (1.5) 0.07 (1 ,9)
Married 0.56 (6.5) 0.41 (3.5) 0.63 (2.9)
Family Size -0.03 (1.5) -0.01 (0.9) -0.02 (0.7)
Rho ---- ---- 0.73 (14.0)
Sample Size 4206 4206 4206
Log-Likelihood -1201 -1517 -1199
Significance Level 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The probit model in column three treats wealth, thus the constraint variables as endogenous. The model
includes random individual effects. Permanent income, relative cost, and the two $ shortage gap variables are in
tens of thousands of dollars, Head Age is a series of dummy variables in L-W.Table A-1: Estimation of Household Wealth and Desired House Value
Variables -og ofHouseValue LogRespondent Log Spouse Wealth
Wage: Tobit Wage: Tobit
Constant 5.69 (3.5) ---- .... 15.95 (0,8)
Wmale 0.10 (1,5) 0.43 (18,0) -2.14 (3.1) 3.73 (3.3)
R/Black 0,26 (2,4) -0.25 (8,2) -0.10 (1.3) 25.32 (2,8)
R/Hispanic -0.27 (3.2) -0.12 (3.6) -0,17 (2.3) -0.78 (0.5)
Married -0.24 (2.2) .... .... -16.17 (4.3)
Years Married .... .... ---- 1,24 (4.9)
Gifi From relatives .... ---- .-.. 0.99 (8.1)
House Price Index .... .... .... 0,07 (0.4)
Parents’ Education .... ..-. .... 0,20 (1.2)
Wlghest Grade ..-. 0.09 (2.0) ---- -3.38 (4,3)
WAge 0.23 (3.7) -0.04 (1.5) .... 0.76 (0.5)
~est Score .-. 0.21 (12,3) ---- 1.02 (1.4)
IUBad Health .... -0,24 (3,5) .... -0.30 (0.2)
S/Highest Grade .... ---- 0,15 (2.4) 0.71 (3.1)
S/Age .... .... 0.08 (2,2) 0,50 (4,4)
fUAgeSquared -0.004 (3,9) 0,001 (2.9) .... -0.60 (1,9)
~est Score Squared ..- -0.02(10.3) .-.. -0.08 (1.2)
~ighest Grade~ ..-. -0.001(0.7) ....
S/Age Squared .... .... -0.001 (1,1)
S/Highest Gradez ..-. .... -0.002 (0,8)
R/Highest Grade-R/Agez .... ---- .... 0.o1 (5,5)
Black-R/Male .-. .... .... -1.07 (0.5)
Black-R/Age .... .... ..-. -1.19 (0.3)
Blrsck-lUHighestGrade .-. .... ---- 0.28 (0,5)
Black-~est Score .... .... .-.. -0.34 (0.6)
Black-S/Age .... .... .-.. 0.08 (0,3)
Black-S/Highest Grade .... .... .-.. -0.58 (1.3)
Black-House Price ...- .... .... 0.11 (0,3)
Log Owner Cost -0.04 (0.3) ---- .... ....
Family Size -0.01 (0.4) ..-. ---- ----
Permanent Income 0,09 (8.0) .... ---- ....
Central City -0.47 (2.7) ---- ---- ....Suburbs -0.23 (1,3) .... .... ....
In Other PartofMSA -0.22 (1,3) .... .... ....
Northeast -0,22 (2,3) .... .... ....
NorthCentrrd 0,04 (0,5) ---- .... ----
West -0.18 (2.0) ---- .... ....
Sample Size 500 4206 4206 4206
I
R-Squared 0.25 .... ----
1
0,21
Notes: The achievement test score in tens. Respondent variables are summarized as “W and spouse variables are “S/”, Interaction variables
are denoted with a “-”.